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Abstract
We tackle, arguably, the central issue in transition - developing contract en-
forcement institutions. In the world of thin markets and immature legal systems,
market failure arises due to contracting problems. Reputation mechanisms may
alleviate such problems in static environments, but may not be fully eﬀective in
evolving, out-of-steady-state transition economies. Building on insights from mod-
ern law economics corroborated by recent evidence, we propose a dynamic theory
of adjustment of these mechanisms.
We model an economy with no public system of contract enforcement, where re-
structuring increases both productivity and exposure to hold-up. The fundamental
transition conundrum is how to make firms restructure, if the degree of restructur-
ing is unobservable. We show that there exists a decentralized adjustment path
along which firms restructure continuously, while signaling that they proceed at
the common pace. As the second part of the paper argues, in transition, existing
networks are expected to be eventually replaced by new networks of restructured
firms. This shortens the eﬀective horizons of the agents and spoils the calcula-
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tion of strategic benefits of cooperative behavior, resulting in a period of relatively
primitive economic activity.
Thus, in the aftermath of transition, new contracts are excessively simple to
economize on enforcement. The new social mechanisms for preventing violations of
contracts take time to develop and will naturally crystallize when restructuring is
complete.
1 Introduction
The problem of contract enforcement is widely acknowledged as a primary issue in tran-
sition of formerly planned economies. The common view is that historically, these coun-
tries have relied on state to enforce dealings among state-owned enterprises. Once the
economies became decentralized and privatized, there was no mechanism in place to en-
force those new agreements. Inherited legal systems were universally viewed as inadequate
for market economies. Many scholars concluded that a speedier upgrading of law enforce-
ment institutions is the most crucial ingredient of the transition success.
Law economists, however, have long argued that legal systems in themselves may be
capable of enforcing only a minority of contracts in an economy. As Rapaczynski [1996]
noted, legal system can solve only marginal cases. Consequently, there must be other
mechanisms in place that support most of the contracts. They must be based not on the
formal enforcement but rather on strategic calculations of future reward associated with
honoring contractual agreements.
Enforcement is so central to the success of transition because industrial organization
is endogenous and determined by institutions. Modern growth is associated with high
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degree of specialization and investment in specific assets. Whenever production requires
specific assets, however, there is room for hold-up. Unless there are ways to make their
partners precommit to terms of contract, firms will prefer not to make those investments
and gear their production structure toward more primitive contracts. In extreme cases
they may resort to barter. Thus, the absence of contract enforcement may lead to selection
into less eﬃcient contracts, and put a ceiling on aggregate productivity, the possibility
highlighted by Blanchard and Kremer [1997]. Arguably, this is what happened in East-
ern Europe, and was most pronounced in Ukraine and Russia. Johnson, McMillan and
Woodruﬀ [1999] provide survey evidence that in transition economies it is indeed the in-
secure contractual environment that hinders investment, not the lack of outside finance.
This leads to a question, will these economies ever succeed in curing the problem? Can
informal mechanisms successfully substitute for formal enforcement? Can this happen
in a decentralized equilibrium? What are the features of the adjustment process? This
paper strives to provide a theory of the evolution of enforcement institutions that is both
micro-based and explicit about the particular incentive mechanism involved.
The issue of contract enforcement is not unique to transition economies. Even in
mature market economies, contracts are maintained both by invoking law and informal
mechanisms (Macaulay [1963], Ellickson [1991], Arrighetti, Bachman and Deakin [1997]).
Relational contracting, or bilateral reputation, is the most frequently cited variety of such
informal mechanisms. Contracting parties expect their partnership to last for a long time
and therefore prefer not to renege on agreements. Ghosh and Ray [1996] study equilibria
in community interaction where bilateral punishment is the only form of sanctioning
available and the reputation needs to be built up. Cooperation arises gradually, as firms
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learn from experience about partner’s reliability.
This type of contracting has a disadvantage of being biased toward established re-
lationships as firms hesitate to try new partners. A superior alternative is oﬀered by
coalitions of firms sanctioning deviations from contracts by boycotts. Greif [1993] re-
counts an illuminating story of the use of multilateral punishment strategies (MPS) by
medieval merchants in Mediterranean. Agents did not cheat on their masters because
they anticipated a boycott by other merchants in case of misconduct. Coalition thus
served as a credible mechanism for punishing breach of contract. Greif shows that MPS
is in general more eﬀective in sanctioning breach than pure relational contracting. More-
over, MPS does not rely on established history of trading and therefore allows contracting
between total strangers. This removes barriers to entry/signing new contracts, present
under relational contracting.
The transition economies present a natural experiment in the evolution of MPS. There
is no public system of contract enforcement in place because it was not needed before
the liberalization. Courts lack expertise and resources to do their job [Pistor, 1996],
while most firms are unaware of or misunderstand new laws [Hendley, Ickes, Murrell and
Ryterman, 1997]. If economic growth is to resume, firms must start making specific
investments, and therefore, find means to enforce complex contracts. Meanwhile, in a
1996 survey of Russian firms, Hendley et al. [1997] found little evidence that enterprises
buy or sell sophisticated complex goods. Only one contractual agreement in their entire
survey was reported as requiring special investment.
This is to be expected, since networks and relationships inherited from the past are
organized around an extremely ineﬃcient model of production, and therefore should be
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eventually dismantled and replaced by new relationships and networks. Before the new
relationships and networks form, most of the production in the economy will remain
primitive.
Indeed, quoting Johnson, McMillan and Woodruﬀ [2000b], “simplest transactions in
markets involve the sale of standardized goods made for inventory and sold for cash. As
markets develop, producers make more customer-specific goods.” In the five countries in
Johnson et al.’s [2000b] survey, specialized goods were likely to be produced for recently
added customers (new partners). Russia and Ukraine produce substantially fewer spe-
cialized goods than firms in Poland, Slovakia, and Romania (consistent with the data on
the relative severity of contracting problems in the former).
The above evidence on specialization of production in transition, together with the
examples of the use of group sanctions in the market economies, suggest that MPS is
crucial for the resurgence of growth in transition countries.
If that is the case, transition countries seem to be moving in the right direction.
Recanatini and Ryterman [2000] document the emergence of new business networks in
Russia. Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman [1999] present evidence that reporting instances
of contract violations to other firms was used by 47.56% firms in their sample. John-
son, McMillan and Woodruf [1999] and Johnson, McMillan and Woodruﬀ [2000a] report
statistical evidence from a recent survey of enterprise managers in 5 transition countries
which show that membership in business and social networks plays a significant role in
decisions to extend trade credit and commence new productive relationships.
All this suggests that informal coalitions play a role in enforcing contracts and it is
therefore important to understand their evolution. The existing models of relational con-
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tracting/MPS are essentially static. Ghosh and Ray’s [1996] analysis is limited to station-
ary equilibria with replacement (so there is no change in the proportions of myopic/non-
myopic types), nor does the nature of types change over time. Greif [1993] also sidesteps
the issue of coalition formation. In his model, the coalition is already in the steady state.
The innovation of our research is to study this enforcement mechanism out of steady
state. Our first model focuses on the aspect of restructuring that is entirely overlooked in
the literature: the need to establish common knowledge that all members of the coalition
have restructured. Restructuring increases productivity of firms if they play cooperative
strategies. However, it also increases exposure of unsuspecting firms to expropriation and
hold-up. Firms have an option of dealing in less productive contracts that also limit their
hold-up exposure.
There exists a steady state in which all firms are finally fully restructured and this
fact is common knowledge, so a simple collective punishment strategy can enforce highly
productive contracts. However, if the degree of restructuring is unobservable to outsiders,
it is not clear whether an economy could get into that steady state at all. An additional
question is whether an economy would be able to do this on its own, with no intervention
of a social planner to coordinate the restructuring eﬀort.
The second part of our paper highlights the role of another aspect of informal collective
enforcement: limitations of liability. We model a situation in which initially firms are
members of a coalition that enforces deals between them. When restructuring starts, this
coalition unravels, as the eﬀective horizon of firms is reduced. At the same time, there
is no coalition able to enforce “mixed” contracts between newly restructured firms and
old firms. Consequently, the new entities also resort to the primitive contracts which are
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impossible to renege on. While this is individually optimal for the firms, society bears an
opportunity cost in the form of more elaborate and socially profitable contracts that are
not implemented. It takes time for the proportion of restructured firms in the economy to
reach the level when they can form a new coalition allowing them to enter into superior
specialized contracts.
The roadmap for the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains motivation for the mod-
eling assumptions of our theory, and some terminological conventions. Sections 3 and 4
present our models. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains a few formal proofs.
2 Specialized contracts, hold-up, and restructuring
We start our discussion of hold-up in contracting with a stylized example which shares
the view of the modern economy outlined in [Kremer, 1993].
Consider aircraft manufacture1. Aircraft are very complex, and their performance (and
hence, the price they command in the market) depends on a huge number of components.
For simplicity, assume the aircraft consists of a body and hydraulics that drives complex
steering system. For best performance, the steering system should conform closely to
general aerodynamic characteristics. To appropriate Kremer’s example, every o-ring and
every single bushing is important. Minor adjustments to design may yield dramatic
improvements. Consequently, it is important that engineers of both companies learn a
lot about their partner’s technology to implement such adjustments. Thus, to produce a
good airplane, manufacturer of the body and that of hydraulics must each make specific
1We thank Andrei Bogdzevitch, a graduate of Baumann Technical University in Moscow, for his help
with this example.
7
investments. They are specific because the minute details of design are not shared by
diﬀerent aircraft and diﬀerent hydraulics.
Suppose the two companies have agreed on a joint production plan. However perfect
the legal system is, with the highly sophisticated technology such as this, it is impossible
to make the specific investments part of a legally binding contract, due to large agency
costs. Such investment will be a matter of good faith among the contracting parties.
Consequently, they may have incentives to hold up each other ex post. Suppose, the
hydraulics firm has done its part and came up with an exemplary design, having spent
huge resources on research and development. However, the aircraft body company reneged
on the agreement and did not make any specific investment. The plane being more than
a mere sum of its components, it has poor fuel economy and maneuverability. Hence, it
sells at a low price2. The specific investment made by hydraulic engineers is by now sunk,
they cannot sell it anywhere else at a respectable price. They are forced to share in the
meager realized profits. The net value of the project to them is negative, precisely due to
that investment. The body manufacturer, on the other hand, enjoys a windfall, since no
costly investment has been made. Only if both firms adhere to their commitments, the
quality of the plane is outstanding, and the ex ante investments are profitable.
The two firms could have also decided on a less ambitious project (an agricultural
plane instead of a supersonic transatlantic carrier). This would require very little specific
investment and consequently, less threat of hold-up. Of course, there is a whole spectrum
of technology choices (all sorts of training, cargo, and commercial aircraft) ranked by the
2In [Economist, 2000], a military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer is quoted as saying “Russian aircraft
design is excellent, but engine reliability is less so. As in the rest of Russian industry, quality control can
be patchy. What Russia sells is quite often actually lemons”.
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complexity of their design and required specialization.
It may seem that an easy solution to the contracting problem is the integration of both
firms into one. In the dynamic Shumpeterian world this is not a solution, however, and
nor is bilateral reputation. After the aircraft project is completed, the hydraulics firm may
get orders for a submarine, construction excavator, or auto power steering. That is why
it is important to make distinction between relationship-specific investment and general
investment. By installing modern equipment, hiring employees with degrees in hydraulic
engineering and skillful managers, acquiring technological expertise, the hydraulics com-
pany may be able to produce better and cheaper products for any market and purpose.
The general and specific investments are complementary for individual projects. Clearly,
today’s aircraft are better than in the 50s not because 50s experienced particularly severe
contracting problems, but because a lot has been learned about technology, and new gen-
eration of equipment is available. That in turn allows dramatic improvements in specific
designs.
The features of production outlined in this subsection are common to all countries,
industrialized and developing. World technical progress is but the path of investment in
general-purpose technologies (broadly interpreted). Transition economies face a partic-
ularly steep upgrade path, given the notorious ineﬃciencies in labor allocation, physical
capital, management, use of technological expertise, etc.
In the remainder of the paper, we adopt terminology that reflects more transition
realities. We label the general investment as “restructuring”. We emphasize the broad
meaning of this word. Restructuring for us stands for reallocation of any resources to their
best productive use. This includes, but is not limited to, investment in physical capital,
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hiring labor force with proper skill mix, employing high-powered incentive contracts to
reduce moral hazard in teams, acquiring “information” capital, funding research and
development, doing marketing studies, and so on.
The more complex the project, the more “specialized” the contract is. More specialized
project requires larger amounts of specific investment for completion and hence involves
more hold-up hazard. In models of Sections 3 and 4 we consider dynamic settings, in
which the story of this Section unfolds within a single moment.
3 Endogenous coalition-building and the evolution of
collective punishment strategies
3.1 Assumptions and notation
We begin by introducing assumptions and notation of the model. Consider a continuum
of firms. Let a (t) ∈ [0, 1] be the degree of restructuring for an individual firm. At any
moment firms produce in randomly matched pairs. They do not observe the type (degree
of restructuring) of their partners. They agree on a contract characterized by specializa-
tion s ∈ [0,+∞) . The value of the joint product (net of variable costs of production and
specific investment made) is F (a1, a2, s) , where F is a monotone symmetric function,
exhibiting complementarities between all arguments: ∂
2F
∂ai∂s
> 0, ∂
2F
∂a1∂a2
> 0 (consistent
with the story in Section 2). This value is produced if both firms honor the contract. If
a firm a2 decides to renege, it obtains defection value d (a1, s) (if matched with a firm
restructured by a1 and the contract specifies complexity s). This value is independent of
the defecting firm’s characteristics and represents pure loss for the cheated firm. If both
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firms in a pair try to cheat on each other simultaneously, they both obtain zero.
Notice how the above assumptions constitute a reduced form of the game outlined in
Section 2. If both firms decide to renege and not make any specific investments, they
produce zero value (equivalent to just covering the costs of production in terms of that
example).
Whenever two firms with identical a’s enter into a contract, they split the surplus
evenly, each getting F (a,a,s)
2
.
Time is discrete in our model. Firms may restructure incrementally at the beginning
of any period subject to a convex cost c (t+ 1) = C (a (t+ 1)− a (t)).
A network, or “coalition” of firms is assumed to exist at all times, which transmits
perfectly information about instances of breach of contract. The only sanction available
to the coalition is the isolation of the deviating firm. Upon expulsion from the coalition,
such a firm finds itself producing an autarchy output y0. Given the discount rate r, the
perpetuity on autarchy output y0 is given by V0 +
P+∞
t=0
¡
1
1+r
¢t
y0.
For any level of restructuring a ∈ [0, 1] there exists s ∈ [0, 1] , such that (a, s) is a
steady state equilibrium with multilateral punishment,
+∞X
t=0
F (a, a, s)
2 (1 + r)t
=
F (a, a, s) (1 + r)
2r
≥ d (a, s) + V0.
This is guaranteed if
F (a, a, 0) (1 + r)
2r
− d (a, 0) > V0 ∀a.
Finally, we assume that for a population of fully restructured firms, the unit special-
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ization of contracts s = 1 is the highest specialization consistent with cooperative steady
state with sanctions. This means that if all firms have a = 1, and the coalition sanctions
cheaters with expulsion, honoring contracts with specialization s = 1 yields the same
value as cheating:
+∞X
t=0
µ
1
1 + r
¶t
F (1, 1, 1)
2
=
(1 + r)F (1, 1, 1)
2r
= d (1, 1) + V0.
The last assumption stipulates that 1 is the maximum contract specialization sustain-
able by the threat of expulsion from the coalition when all firms are fully restructured.
3.2 Common knowledge as a pre-requisite for a cooperative
“norm”
Consider the long run steady state where all firms have a = 1. If F (1,1,1)(1+r)
2r
= d (1, 1)+V0,
fully specialized contract is the equilibrium but for all types of firms a < 1 it would be
optimal to deviate and hold up the partner. The equilibrium strategy of honoring the
contract is weakly dominated by reneging if partner’s type is uncertain and unobservable.
Thus, the assumption implicit in the definition of equilibrium is that players’ types are
common knowledge. This has been lucidly explained by Rubinstein [1989]. Specifically,
it should be common knowledge that all firms have a = 1. If it were not, and firm A
did not observe its partner’s type, the firm might be afraid to be held up and so cheat
preemptively. Or suppose that a firm A would know that the partner firm B is fully
restructured, but would not know whether firm B knows that firm A is fully restructured.
Since the incentive constraint is binding for a = 1, any firm with a < 1 would defect, so
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the firm B may be afraid and strike preemptively, and so there is little reason for firm A
to try to cooperate. This reasoning may be infinitely repeated.
Often overlooked, common knowledge is therefore a fundamental pre-requisite for mul-
tilateral enforcement. We argue that common knowledge that all members of the coalition
have fully restructured is the elusive “social norm” of the evolutionary games literature
[Bicchieri, Jeﬀrey and Skyrms, 1997]. We now proceed with a stylized picture of adjust-
ment.
Consider the initial population of unrestructured (a = 0) firms. There is a potential
long-run steady state in which all firms will have a = 1, this fact being common knowl-
edge. In order to get to that steady state firms must invest resources in restructuring.
However, if restructuring is unobservable, where does common knowledge come from?
The conundrum of transition is precisely how to make firms restructure, if the degree of
restructuring is unobservable. We propose a very simple answer to this question.
Restructured firms are assumed to be more productive and at the same time more
vulnerable to hold-up. They may deal in either more primitive or more specialized con-
tracts. Primitive contracts involve less hold-up hazard than specialized contracts, but
the latter are more productive. Restructuring alters the incentives to engage in hold-up
because restructuring and contract specialization are complementary. The more a firm
restructures, the more value it places on ambitious highly specialized contracts, the higher
its opportunity cost of deviating.
Therefore, for a static coalition using a multilateral punishment strategy (MPS) to be
eﬀective in preventing deviations, MPS must be made conditional on the lowest potential
type of enterprises that may be present in the coalition. If the incentive compatibility
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constraint binds for this lowest type, it will be a fortiori satisfied for all higher types.
The coalition will benefit from the uniform full restructuring of all firms since that
maximizes their productivity. In order to get there, all potential deviators should be
weeded along the path, so that in the steady state the universally full restructuring is
common knowledge. This requires a dynamic path on which the incentives of the firms
are carefully aligned (firms find it optimal to restructure at the same pace as others).
This path actually exists if the firms are ex ante identical. From the start, the coalition
embraces all firms. At any period firms allocate their output between dividends and
restructuring. The increase in the latter is such that a firm that invests less will find
it optimal to renege on its contract immediately and will be expelled from the coalition.
The dynamic trade-oﬀ is between a) not investing anything, expropriating a partner once,
and being expelled from the coalition, and b) restructuring at the equilibrium pace and
enjoying rewards from staying in the coalition forever. These two alternatives should be
at least equally attractive for the firms to keep restructuring. This is achieved by the
other variable parameter, the specialization of contracts (positively related to exposure)
in each period. It must not be too high to cause an immediate widespread defection.
At any point on the equilibrium path firms reveal themselves to keep restructuring
at the equilibrium rate by not reneging, and simultaneously, incentives are provided to
induce firms to do this. At the end the very fact that each firm stayed in the coalition
signals full restructuring. At that time the coalition can resort to the most productive
contracts available without the risk that an alien type prone to breach of contract lurks
among the members.
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3.3 Symmetric equilibria
3.3.1 Dynamic problem of a representative firm
The clock starts at t = 0. Since in a symmetric equilibrium firms are identical at all
times, they split the output they produce evenly, obtaining 1
2
F (a∗ (t) , a∗ (t) , s (t)) . In any
moment t > 0 each firm takes the trajectories of specialization s (t) and representative
restructuring a∗ (t) as given, but may decide to deviate. The general deviation scenario is
as follows: the firmmay continue restructuring for some time at some pace a (t) 6≡ a∗ (t) for
t ≤ T.At time T the firm reneges on the contemporaneous contract collecting the defection
value d (a∗ (T ) , s (T )) . Upon this, it is expelled from the coalition and produces the
autarchy output in perpetuity, V0 =
P+∞
t=T
¡
1
1+r
¢t−T
y0. While on the deviation trajectory,
the firm needs to camouflage itself, thereby letting the other firms get the value they would
obtain in a match with a normal firm. Hence, it gets the balance F (a∗ (t) , a (t) , s (t))−
1
2
F (a∗ (t) , a∗ (t) , s (t)). Summarizing,
max
a(t),T
T−1X
τ=t
µ
1
1 + r
¶τ−t ·
F (a∗ (τ) , a (τ ) , s (τ))− 1
2
F (a∗ (τ) , a∗ (τ) , s (τ ))− c (τ)
¸
+
µ
1
1 + r
¶T−t
[d (a∗ (T ) , s (T )) + V0] (1)
s.t. c (t+ 1) = C (a (t+ 1)− a (t))
Suppose, C (a (t+ 1)− a (t)) = (a (t+ 1)− a (t))2 . Then, a (t+ 1) = a (t)+pc (t+ 1).
The terminal conditions are a (0) = 0, a (T ) ≤ 1.
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The Euler equation for this maximization problem is
2 (1 + r)
p
c (t+ 1) =
∂F (a∗t , at, st)
∂at
+ 2
p
c (t). (2)
Optimal T ∗ is the earliest T such that
F (a∗ (T ) , a (T ) , s (T ))− 1
2
F (a∗ (T ) , a∗ (T ) , s (T ))− c (T )
≤ d (a∗ (T ) , s (T ))− 1
1 + r
d (a∗ (T + 1) , s (T + 1)) +
r
1 + r
V0.
or infinity if no such T exists. Transversality implies c (T ∗) = 0 (or limt→+∞ c (t) = 0 if
T ∗ = +∞).
In equilibrium, condition (2) must be satisfied with a (t) ≡ a∗ (t) .
Proposition 1 In any symmetric deterministic equilibrium, T ∈ {0,+∞} .
Proof. Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which finite T > 0. Then it is better for
a firm to cheat at time T − 1 gaining value
d (a∗ (T − 1) , s (T − 1)) + V0
instead of
1
2
F (a∗ (T − 1) , a∗ (T − 1) , s (T − 1))− c (T − 1) + 1
1 + r
V0
(by model assumptions, 1
2
F (a∗, a∗, s) ≤ r
1+r
d (a∗, s) + r
1+r
V0).
Intuitively, if firms wait till T, they get zero defection value with probability 1. By out-
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stripping their partner by one period, they obtain a positive defection value. Consequently,
no finite positive T can be an equilibrium.
3.3.2 Multiple equilibria and existence
For a given path of s (t) , there may be multiple equilibria. Suppose, a non-degenerate
equilibrium exists (the one where T = +∞). The one with T = 0 will also be an equi-
librium simply due to self-fulfilling prophecies (if everyone expects anyone else to defect
at date 0, the privately optimal strategy is to do the same). To resolve questions of
equilibrium existence, we may consider a quasi-equilibrium. This is a configuration that
would be an equilibrium in an economy with perfect contract enforcement (no defection
option).
Notation 1 The value function (conditional on the paths of a (·) , a∗ (·) , and s (·)) V (t)
is
V (t| {a∗ (·) , a (·) , s (·)}) =
+∞X
τ=t
F (a∗ (τ) , a (τ ) , s (τ ))− 1
2
F (a∗ (τ ) , a∗ (τ ) , s (τ ))− c (τ )
(1 + r)
τ−t
=
+∞X
τ=t
F (a∗, a, s)− 1
2
F (a∗, a∗, s)− C (a (τ)− a (τ − 1))
(1 + r)
τ−t (3)
Definition 1 A symmetric quasi-equilibrium is a trajectory a∗ (t) such that all firms find
it optimal to restructure at the common pace, if not given the option of defecting. For-
mally, a∗ (t) should be a fixed point of the correspondence
max
a(t)
V (0) (4)
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Definition 2 A quasi-equilibrium is called viable if it is also a Nash equilibrium when
defection is allowed.
Proposition 2 A quasi-equilibrium exists for any s (t) .
Proof. In the appendix.
The equilibrium restructuring trajectory a∗ (t) positively depends on the path of s (t) .
Formally:
Proposition 3 Consider s (t) and s˜ (t) , such that s˜ (t) ≥ s (t) for all t and. The quasi-
equilibrium paths a∗ (t) , a˜∗ (t) are such that a˜∗ (t) ≥ a∗ (t) .
Proof. In the appendix.
3.3.3 Pareto-ranked equilibria and the choice of s (t)
How is s (t) determined? Given that for any s (t) there exists an equilibrium, this is a
classical coordination problem. Some paths of s (t) may be better than others if they
yield higher intertemporal payoﬀs to representative firms.
In equilibrium, T ∈ {0,+∞} . Hence, the problem of finding best s (t) falls into two:
finding s (t) that maximizes V (0) if there are no enforcement problems; and checking that
the obtained quasi-equilibrium is viable as a Nash equilibrium once defection is allowed.
We argue that these two problems can be dealt with simultaneously.
Paths of s (t) resulting in non-viable quasi-equilibria can be disposed of immediately,
since in actual equilibria defection is instantaneous, and no restructuring ever takes place.
The social welfare is the lowest since the economy failed to take advantage of restructuring.
So we need only concentrate on s (t) that result in viable quasi-equilibria. Viability implies
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that in quasi-equilibrium,
V (t) =
+∞X
τ=t
µ
1
1 + r
¶τ−t ·
1
2
F (a∗ (τ) , a∗ (τ) , s (τ ))− c (τ)
¸
≥ d (a∗ (t) , s (t)) + V0 (5)
at all t. Here a∗ (t) are the fixed points of the maximum correspondence (4).
Proposition 4 The socially optimal s (t) must satisfy (5) as an equality for all t ≥ 0
such that s (t) < 1 with a possible exception of a zero-measure set.
Proof. In the appendix.
Notation 2 We denote the socially optimal path of contract specialization by s∗ (t).
Proposition 5 The socially optimal s∗ (t) and induced symmetric profiles a∗ (t) consti-
tute a unique coalition-proof equilibrium.
Proof. In the appendix.
3.4 Properties of equilibrium adjustment paths
The preceding section has characterized coalition proof equilibrium paths. Proposition 4
reduced the problem of finding this equilibrium to solving
V (t) = d (a∗ (t) , s (t)) + V0
in conjunction with the Euler equations (2) and symmetric equilibrium condition a (t) ≡
a∗ (t) .We supplement these with the recursive formula for the value function and the
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incentive compatibility constraint to obtain a system
ct−1 =
1
4 (1 + r)2
·
∂F (a∗t , at, st)
∂at
+ 2
√
ct
¸2
at−1 = at −√ct
a∗t ≡ at
Vt−1 =
1
2
F
¡
a∗t−1, a
∗
t−1, st−1
¢− ct−1 + 1
1 + r
Vt
Vt−1 = d (at−1, st−1) + V0
As this problem is unsolvable in closed form, we simulate the model numerically. The
system can be solved backwards starting from the terminal conditions a (T ) = 1, s (T ) = 1,
c (T ) = 0, V (T ) = d (1, 1) + V0.
Figure 1 depicts a sample equilibrium path. Adjustment begins rather cautiously as
firms set rather unambitious contractual goals. They do that out of fear of the breach of
contract, knowing that opportunity costs are relatively low. At the same time firms do
not defect not because their current surplus is large, but because staying in the coalition
gives them an option value of profitable business opportunities in the future. Notice
that because this option value is positive, the specialization levels observed along the
adjustment path are not consistent with stationary equilibria. It is the expectation of
future increase in productivity that keeps businesses on the bandwagon. In finite time,
the entire economy has completed restructuring, entering the long run steady state.
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3.4.1 Adjustment with and without outside contract enforcement
To highlight the implications of the need to align incentives in the coalition we compare
this path to an equilibrium adjustment path in the same economy, but with no defection
option. One immediately realizes that specialization in this economy is kept at the feasible
maximum: s ≡ 1. This maximizes contract surplus for any values of a, and is feasible
because the firms cannot cheat anyway. Consequently, output is higher along the entire
path, which allows for faster restructuring (see Figure 2). The comparison between an
economy with and without perfect outside enforcement reveals the contribution of the
need to align incentives to the speed of adjustment. Another instructive comparison is
between spending on restructuring on both paths (see Figure 3). The economy without
outside contract enforcement is held back in the initial stages of adjustment when the
need to prevent deviations is the greatest.
3.4.2 Monotonicity of specialization path
It may seem that s (t) must be increasing along the adjustment path. This is not true for
all functional forms of d (·) and F (·) . An example is provided in Figure 4, where function
d (·) was made very insensitive to s in the lower ranges of a, and very sensitive to s at
high a. When firms are unrestructured, the defection value is small. Consequently, they
may take advantage of specialized contracts for a while. However, soon the incentive
constraint bites, and the coalition is forced to cut back specialization. It then follows an
upward path, culminating in full specialization only when the universal restructuring is
complete.
This is more than a mere theoretical possibility. An extremely outdated economy
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with a legacy of a highly complex production structure may not even present enough
opportunities for hold-up. Say, instead of producing radios with the transistors that a
supplier sent, the radio firm sells these for cash in a flea market. If value of the products
that unrestructured firms can produce has fallen dramatically, the gain from holding up
a partner is also small. However, as soon as new activity sprouts, the defection will look
more and more attractive. This could generate a U-shaped pattern of specialization.
Instead, an agricultural economy would never go through this phase because it never
produced specialized goods before. This might distinguish Russia and China, for example.
3.5 Importance of implicit signalling
The previous section painted a picture of restructuring as a gradual process. It may
be argued that this is an artifact of the convex restructuring costs assumption3 and
the need to generate funds internally to finance the adjustment. This section argues
that restructuring is gradual because of the need to establish common knowledge of the
process.
Consider what happens along the adjustment path outlined in Section 3.3. All firms
restructure at the common pace a∗ (t) . Consider a firm that for some reason finds itself
behind: a (t) < a∗ (t) . Because it starts with smaller value of the state variable, its
intertemporal payoﬀ is lower than that of a compliant firm:
V˜ (t) < V (t)
3Notice that with linear felicity function, no firm in our model can be liquidity-constrained.
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But in the coalition-proof equilibrium,
V (t) = d (a∗ (t) , s (t)) + V0
Consequently,
V˜ (t) < d (a∗ (t) , s (t)) + V0
and the firm lagging behind finds it optimal to defect immediately. The fact that such
defections are not observed on the equilibrium path, therefore, signals that all firms push
onward together, and at the time T where a∗ (T ) = 1, it is common knowledge that
restructuring has been universal.
It is instructive to consider a modification of the model in which firms’ budget con-
straint is radically relaxed in the following sense. Suppose that at time t = 0 firms are
given a lump-sum amount S which is suﬃcient to propel every firm to full restructuring
immediately (suppose S covers costs of importing all factors of production). Will the
firms exercise this option? The answer is no.
Assuming that every other firm has honestly spent S on restructuring, if an individual
firm also restructures, it obtains a perpetuity F (1,1,1)(1+r)
2r
= d (1, 1) + V0. However, by
defecting immediately and diverting S for dividends gives S + d (1, 1) + V0 >
F (1,1,1)(1+r)
2r
.
Therefore, it is a best response to deviate. The only equilibrium path in which cooperation
takes hold is the one identified in Section 3.3.
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3.6 Constrained eﬃciency
This section inquires into issues of eﬃciency. The need to enforce contracts is a funda-
mental constraint on any economy. Therefore, our comparison benchmark is an economy
with no outside contract enforcement, but perfect information. If restructuring were
observable, would an economy be able to get to the long run steady state faster?
In this alternative setup, any path a (t) can be made an equilibrium, provided it
satisfies the incentive compatibility condition (5). a (t) need not be a fixed point of the
best response correspondence (4). Once the equilibrium specifies a (t) , the (observed)
non-compliers are threatened by expulsion from coalition.
Note that this is also equivalent to the problem of a social planner, able to dictate
the pace of restructuring to firms; it is in this sense that the equilibrium is a constrained
optimum. Consider the problem of maximizing (3) having imposed a (t) ≡ a∗ (t) :
maxV ({a∗ (·) , s (·)}) = max
+∞X
τ=0
µ
1
1 + r
¶τ ·
1
2
F (a∗ (τ) , a∗ (τ) , s (τ))− c (τ)
¸
It may seem, there is an externality that is internalized by the social planner. However,
since F (a1, a2, s) is symmetric for a1 and a2, the Euler equations turn out to be exactly
the same in the social planner’s problem (2) as in the decentralized equilibrium of section
3.3 (observe that ∂F (a
∗,a,s)
∂a
= 1
2
∂F (a∗,a,s)
∂a
+ 1
2
∂F (a∗,a,s)
∂a∗ =
dF (a∗,a∗,s)
da∗ if a = a
∗). We conclude
that the decentralized equilibrium with unobservable restructuring is eﬃcient. The reason
behind this result is that each firm considers itself a residual claimant when calculating
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its optimal pace of restructuring, thus internalizing the externality4.
This is a remarkable result. It says that the dynamic coalition is construed in a
way that reveals information at no cost to the economy (in terms of missed business
opportunities). Thus, the coalition is able to overcome the information problems perfectly.
4 Limitations of liability and coalition constituency
This section presents our second model, formally detached from the first, which focuses
on implications of fundamental, non-legal liability limitations for evolution of enforcement
institutions. The limitation is that if a firm disintegrates and its assets and factors of pro-
duction are recycled in the economy, the new firm that happens to employ these factors,
or acquire the assets, may not bear responsibility for the actions of the predecessor. De-
spite all legacies of the past embodied in the stocks of human, physical, and infrastructure
capital, in that sense only restructuring is indeed starting from a blank page.
4.1 Assumptions of the model
4.1.1 Production and defection
This model shares many assumptions with the one presented in the previous section.
A major simplification is that both restructuring and contract specialization are binary
variables. There is a continuum of firms which can potentially be of two types: 1, 2. In the
beginning, all firms are of type 1 (unrestructured). Type 2 firms are restructured firms.
As any firm is but a mix of factors of production, it is useful to think about restructuring
4This would not hold if the production function were asymmetric, and the population of firms were
divided into two classes, say, upstream and downstream, and they would enter the function diﬀerently.
However, as long as each firm on average plays both roles, the eﬃciency result will hold nevertheless.
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in this context as a death of an old firm and birth of a new one, whose factor mix has a
substantial overlap with that of the old one.
Production in this economy is also carried out by pairs of firms. Firms of types i and
j may enter into two types of contractual agreements: a primitive or a specialized one.
Contracts last for one period and are characterized by the net surpluses accruing to both
parties: firms of type i and j get respectively Yij and Yji. For simplicity, we make the
indivisibility assumption: the two firms are not allowed to divide the total surplus in any
other way. Either firm may cheat on the other. This way firms obtain the defection value
D. If the firm of type j reneges on the agreement, it gets a surplus of Dji, while the firm
of type i gets (−Dji) (this being a zero-sum game) and vice versa if it is type i firm that
defects.
A primitive contract is similar to the specialized one but the surpluses created are yij
and yji, where yij < Yij ∀i, j. The defection values are zero: dij = 0 ∀i, j.
Adopting the assumptions of Section 3 in the binary case, we make the following
assumptions about relative productivities of various matches:
Y11 < Y12 ≤ Y21 < Y22,
y11 < y12 ≤ y21 < y22 < Y11
Each period, unrestructured firms get an opportunity to restructure with probability
ρ < 1. Restructuring is costless. Firms may or may not take advantage of this opportunity
(restructuring is a decision variable). p1 (t) and p2 (t) denote proportions of firms of each
type at time t, p1 (t) + p2 (t) ≡ 1.
If at any time firms of both types coexist in the economy, the distribution of the
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types of matches created is determined solely by population proportions. Literally, the
proportion of (1, 1) matches is p21, that of (2, 2) matches is p
2
2, and there are 2p1p2 mixed
(1, 2) matches. This assumption implies that restructured businesses cannot segregate
themselves from the rest of the economy.
The assumptions on the defection values will be presented below. We again assume
that firms maximize their intertemporal surplus (inclusive of defection gains/losses), dis-
counted at rate r. As a shortcut, we sometimes use δ = 1
1+r
(the discount factor).
4.1.2 Information
In contrast to Section 3, the information on which firms can condition their choices, is the
type of the firm {1, 2}, and, if they belong to a coalition, whether or not the other party
has ever cheated on the contracts enforced by that coalition. However, if an unrestructured
firm has cheated and later became type 2, no memory of the original defection remains.
This captures the central assumption of liability limitations. A restructured firm is a
new mix of factors of production which has a substantial overlap with the mix in the
unrestructured firm. We assume it is impossible to discriminate on the basis of such things
as, for example, the fact that 75% of employees of a restructured firm were previously
on the roll of an unrestructured firm that had cheated, or the firm is housed in the same
building, and so forth.
4.1.3 Coalitions and contracting
Firms may organize into networks providing for collective sanctions for breach of contract.
We call such networks coalitions. Individual firms may join if the value of staying in the
coalition exceeds that of opting out. Coalitions transmit perfectly information about
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instances of breach of contract.
Every period, having observed the type of their match, firms decide whether to sign
a contract, and what type of contract, primitive or specialized. Hence, the additional
choice variables of the firms of type i are:
1. Type of the contract, when matched with a firm of type j that has never reneged
on contracts, CHij (t) ∈ {S,P,N} (specialized, primitive, or no contract).
2. Type of the contract, when matched with a firm of type j that has previously
cheated on a partner, CCij (t) ∈ {S, P,N}.
3. Whether to renege on a contract.
4.2 Static coalitions
Before endeavouring to describe transition dynamics it may be useful to describe two
steady states: the one that prevails before the restructuring, and the one that will even-
tually be reached.
Since primitive contracts are trivially enforceable (dij = 0 < yij), here we discuss
conditions for enforcement of specialized contracts in stationary equilibria (when all en-
terprises remain forever of the same type, say, 1). In absence of collective sanctions, firms
have incentives to renege on specialized contracts if Y11 < D11 (since there is a continuum
of firms, the threat of unilateral sanctions can be ignored).
If the coalition of all the firms sanctions breach with exclusion, there is a trade-oﬀ
between
• being honest and staying in the coalition, expecting to getP+∞t=0 Y11δt = 1+rr Y11
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• defecting and getting D11.
The threat of exclusion is viable if
1 + r
r
Y11 > D11. (6)
Notice that exclusion (which dictates that coalition members not enter into any contracts
with cheaters) is the strongest form of punishment available. To ensure that coalition
members do this instead of signing primitive contracts, we assume that a firm is punished
for having any business with cheaters. This ensures that no firm ever has an incentive to
deviate.
Similarly, we assume that specialized contracts are sustainable in a stationary equi-
librium in which all firms are restructured:
1 + r
r
Y22 > D22. (7)
4.3 An equilibrium adjustment path
4.3.1 Conditions for existence of a joint coalition
We start our equilibrium analysis at time 0. Before t = 0, firms were organized into a
coalition enforcing specialized (1, 1) contracts, thus each firm have been getting surplus
Y11 for t < 0. At time 0 the economy learns about the restructuring option (firms begin
getting the random restructuring opportunity for t ≥ 1). We will assume that on the
adjustment path all firms restructure when given the opportunity to do, and later show
that this in fact constitutes an equilibrium.
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If this is so, the relative proportions of types are
p1 (t) = (1− ρ)t
p2 (t) = 1− (1− ρ)t
(8)
For all t > 0, restructured and unrestructured firms will coexist. We first study when
a joint coalition of firms of both types is viable. It may seem that in light of conditions
(6), (7) it is enough to have
1 + r
r
Y12 > D12 (9)
1 + r
r
Y21 > D21 (10)
However, the situation is more complicated as unrestructured firms expect to get
punishment only until they restructure. This magnifies the eﬀective discount rate.
Consider the trade-oﬀ of an unrestructured firm whether to cheat or not at time T on a
contract (1, j) , j = 1, 2. Conditional on still being unrestructured at T , the probability of
restructuring at time t > T is p1(t)
p1(T )
(since the aggregate proportions are also the individual
probabilities). Under the expectation that the coalition will prevail indefinitely into the
future, the firm expects to get
D1j +
+∞X
t=T+1
µ
1− p1 (t)
p1 (T )
¶
(p1 (t)Y21 + p2 (t)Y22) δ
t−T ,
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if it cheats, and
Y1j +
+∞X
t=T+1
p1 (t)
p1 (T )
(p1 (t)Y11 + p2 (t)Y12) δ
t−T +
+∞X
t=T+1
µ
1− p1 (t)
p1 (T )
¶
(p1 (t)Y21 + p2 (t)Y22) δ
t−T
otherwise.
D1j > Y1j +
+∞X
t=T+1
p1 (t)
p1 (T )
(p1 (t)Y11 + p2 (t)Y12) δ
t−T
= Y1j +
X (1− ρ)t
(1− ρ)T
£
(1− ρ)t Y11 +
¡
1− (1− ρ)t¢ Y12¤ δt−T
=

Y12
1+r
ρ+r
+ (1−ρ)
T+2
2ρ−ρ2+r (Y11 − Y12) , j = 2
Y11 + (1− ρ) Y12ρ+r + (1−ρ)
T+2
2ρ−ρ2+r (Y11 − Y12) , j = 1
The term (1−ρ)
T+2
2ρ−ρ2+r (Y11 − Y12) is negative, and converges to zero as T becomes large.
The necessary conditions for the coalition to be viable at least for some T are

D12 ≤ Y12 1+rρ+r
D11 ≤ Y11 + (1− ρ) Y12ρ+r
(11)
which are stronger than either (9) or (6). It is in this sense that the dynamic nature of
transition presents challenges to contract enforcement. While specialized contracts only
require (6), (7), (9), and (10) to be enforceable in a stationary equilibrium, stronger con-
ditions (11) are necessary (not even suﬃcient) on a dynamic adjustment path. Whether
or not (11) hold, depends to a large extent on the relative magnitudes of the discount
rate r and restructuring rate ρ. For r = ρ = 0.05, (11) imply D12 ≤ 10.5Y12, while the
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stationary assumption (9) only requires D12 ≤ 21Y12, the two-fold diﬀerence!
Enforceability conditions are slightly stretched for type 2 firms as well, they require
D22 ≤ 1 + r
r
Y22 + (1− ρ)T 1 + r
ρ+ r
(Y21 − Y22) ,
which for large enough T, though, coincides with (10). There is also a possibility that even
if incentive compatibility for individual firms is assured, such an equilibrium path is not
coalition-proof. Intuitively, the group of all restructured firms may decide to collectively
desert the joint coalition when the number of type 1 businesses becomes small. Why
should the group of restructured firms bear the cost of enforcing mixed contracts (by
excluding type 2 firms that cheated on type 1s) if such contracts increasingly become a
rarity? A representative type 2 firm in the sub-coalition has an expected value5 of
p1 (T )D21 + p2 (T )Y22 +
+∞X
t=T+1
p2 (t)Y22δ
t−T ,
if the sub-coalition decides to quit at time T . If the desertion never happens, representa-
tive firm gets
+∞X
t=T
(p1 (t)Y21 + p2 (t)Y22) δ
t−T
Using (8) to substitute for pit, the former expression is smaller than or equal to the latter
5Computed under the pessimistic scenario that unrestructured firms will stick to the strategy of
punishing all type 2 firms.
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if
p1 (T )D21 ≤
+∞X
t=T
p1 (t)Y21δ
t−T ⇔
D21 ≤
+∞X
t=T
[(1− ρ) δ]t−T Y21 ⇔
D21 ≤ Y21
1− δ (1− ρ) =
1 + r
ρ+ r
Y21 (12)
This condition turned out to be independent of T . Even if (10) holds, it may still be
the case that
1 + r
ρ+ r
Y21 < D21 ≤ 1 + r
r
Y21.
This says that even if a joint coalition was viable in a stationary state (where proportions
are constant), it may not be on a non-stationary adjustment path.
What happens when any of the conditions (11) or (12) are not satisfied (assumption
NJC, for “No Joint Coalition”)? The joint coalition never takes hold. We summarize this
in
Proposition 6 The joint coalition of firms of both types is non-viable under any of the
following conditions:
D21 >
1 + r
ρ+ r
Y21
D12 >
1 + r
ρ+ r
Y12
D11 > Y11 + (1− ρ) Y12
ρ+ r
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Firms therefore obtain surpluses y12 and y21 in mixed matches. We refer
The rest of our analysis assumes that one of the conditions in proposition 6 indeed
destroys the potential joint coalition.
4.3.2 Coalition jump-starting, coalition unraveling
If the joint coalition is non-viable, perhaps, the two homogeneous coalitions may be able
to solve enforcement problems for same-type matches.
Restructured firms We consider first a potential coalition of restructured firms by
verifying whether it is able to deter breach of (2, 2) contracts by the harshest possible
punishment, starting at a moment T . Expected intertemporal payoﬀ to a firm that honors
the contract is
Y22 +
X
t=T+1
(p1 (t) y21 + p2 (t)Y22) δ
t−T ,
compared to a cheater’s payoﬀ
D22 +
X
t=T+1
p1 (t) y21δ
t−T .
The former is greater or equal to the latter if
Y22 +
+∞X
t=T+1
p2 (t)Y22δ
t−T ≥ D22 ⇔
Y22
Ã
1 +
+∞X
t=T+1
¡
1− (1− ρ)t¢ δt−T! ≥ D22 ⇔
2r + 1
r
− D22
Y22
≥ (1− ρ)
T+1
r + ρ
(13)
34
The RHS of the last condition is decreasing in T since ρ ∈ (0, 1) . Consequently, this
condition will hold for any parameter values for large enough T.
Notation 3 Suppose s solves (13) as an equality:
(1− ρ)s+1
r + ρ
=
2r + 1
r
− D22
Y22
s = −1 + ln
µ
(r + ρ)
·
2r + 1
r
− D22
Y22
¸¶Á
ln (1− ρ) (14)
Time [s] + 1 is the earliest period when the coalition of type 2 firms is viable. This is
an important milestone on the adjustment path. Prior to [s] + 1, restructured firms must
resort to primitive contracts in all their dealing. Thereafter they become collectively able
to enforce specialized contracts among restructured firms, enjoying higher surpluses. The
economy as a whole, with the proportion of such firms converging to unity, is finally on
the last lap to the long-run steady state.
A few simple comparisons follow straightforwardly from (14): reorganization occurs
later (s is greater) when either
• immediate rewards from defection are greater (D22 is larger),
• surplus of specialized contracts is lower (Y22 is smaller),
• restructuring proceeds at a faster rate (ρ is greater),
• or discount rate r is larger (under an additional assumption ρ > 2r2).
Unrestructured firms Consider now the trade-oﬀ of an unrestructured firm whether
to cheat or not at time T > [s] . Conditional on still being unrestructured at T , the
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probability of restructuring at time t > T is p1(t)
p1(T )
. Under the expectation that the
coalition of type 1 will prevail indefinitely into the future, a firm expects to get
D11 +
+∞X
t=T+1
p1 (t)
p1 (T )
p2 (t) y12δ
t−T +
+∞X
t=T+1
µ
1− p1 (t)
p1 (T )
¶
(p1 (t) y21 + p2 (t)Y22) δ
t−T ,
if it cheats, and
Y11 +
+∞X
t=T+1
p1 (t)
p1 (T )
(p1 (t)Y11 + p2 (t) y12) δ
t−T +
+∞X
t=T+1
µ
1− p1 (t)
p1 (T )
¶
(p1 (t) y21 + p2 (t)Y22) δ
t−T
if it does not, the latter terms of both expressions being the same due to the liability
limitation assumption. It is preferable to cheat whenever
D11 > Y11
Ã
1 +
+∞X
t=T+1
p21 (t)
p1 (T )
δt−T
!
= Y11
Ã
1 +
+∞X
t=T+1
(1− q)2t−T δt−T
!
= Y11
Ã
1 +
(1− q)T+2
r + 2ρ− ρ2
!
The limit of the last expression when T gets large is Y11, and D11 > Y11. Therefore, there
exists time when the coalition will be no longer viable. However, if the MPS breaks down
at time T, this alters the trade-oﬀ at time T − 1, as cheaters do not expect to get any
punishment at t ≥ T . Since D11 > Y11, they would prefer to cheat, and so the MPS does
not work even at T − 1. The coalition unravels as we repeat backward induction.
How robust is the conclusion that on an adjustment path, a coalition with shrinking
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constituency never takes hold, even temporarily? The outcome is homomorphic to that
in the famous “centipede” game [Rosenthal, 1981; Binmore, 1987]. While in the unique
Sequential Nash equilibrium the game ends in the first round of play, this prediction
was refuted in an experimental study by McKelvey and Palfrey [1992], who have most
of the time observed long histories of actual play. A more reserved prediction in the
transition context, therefore, would be that the old networks will function for a while but
will eventually decline, marking switch to primitive contracts.
4.3.3 Individual rationality of restructuring choice
So far we have ignored the issue of the individual rationality of restructuring. Instead we
have been assuming that firms take the first available opportunity to restructure. Below
we verify whether this is indeed their optimal strategy.
A firm that at time T passes the opportunity to restructure (and commits never to
restructure later) obtains expected discounted surplus of
+∞X
t=T
[p1 (t) y11 + p2 (t) y12] δ
t−T
Otherwise it would obtain (assuming for simplicity that T < [s])
[s]X
t=T
[p1 (t) y21 + p2 (t) y22] δ
t−T +
+∞X
t=[s]+1
[p1 (t) y21 + p2 (t)Y22] δ
t−T .
It is obvious that the latter payoﬀ dominates the former, as y21 > y11, Y22 > y22 > y12.
(The same conclusion is obviously reached if the firm passing the opportunity does not
actually commit to this strategy in the future). Therefore, it is indeed individually optimal
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for firms to restructure at their first opportunity.
4.3.4 Summary of properties of the adjustment path
The economy is initially in the steady state with a MPS in place enforcing specialized
contracts. Surplus of a representative firm is Y11. Suddenly, the environment changes,
making the current organization of production suboptimal. Firms learn about the change,
and start randomly getting opportunities to restructure. All of them take their first
available opportunity to do so.
The existing coalition is destroyed when the news arrives, so the firms that have not yet
had a chance to restructure enter only into primitive contracts with each other. Under the
NJC assumption, there exists no feasible collective mechanism to enforce mixed specialized
contracts, either. For all t ≤ [s] , restructured firms enter only into primitive contracts
with each other. The situation changes at t = [s]+1, where the new homogeneous coalition
forms, enforcing specialized (2, 2) contracts. The economy then gradually converges to
the long-run steady state in which all firms are restructured.
4.3.5 Transitory output decline
We show that our model exhibits transitory output decline, if we interpret aggregate
surplus in our model as output net of investment and resource costs. Subject to that
qualification, the surplus of an average firm starts at Y11 just before the onset of restruc-
turing. It falls to y11 < Y11 at t = 0, and until time [s] + 1 is given by
p21 (t) y11 + p1p2 (y12 + y21) + p
2
2y22
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For parameter values such that [s] > 0, the surplus will be below Y11 all t = 0, .., [s] since
yij < Y11. For t˙ > [s] , the surplus of an average firm is
p21 (t) y11 + p1p2 (y12 + y21) + p
2
2Y22
As t → ∞, p1 (t) → 0, and this average surplus converges to Y22 > Y11. Hence, the
economy will eventually overshoot the initial level Y11. Therefore, along the equilibrium
adjustment path, aggregate surplus follows a U-shaped trajectory.
4.4 Stagnation equilibrium
So far we have focused on an equilibrium in which adjustment was individually optimal
for firms. This optimality was however derived under the assumption that everyone else
restructures, and therefore, represents a classic coordination game. There is another,
stagnant equilibrium in which no firm ever restructures.
For an individual firm that got an restructuring option, expected payoﬀ in all following
periods is y21 because the rest of the firms do not restructure, and because the coalition
of type 1 firms is not expected to enforce the one mixed specialized contract6.
Which equilibrium is better? The expected intertemporal surplus of a representative
firm at time 0 is
V (ρ) =
+∞X
t=1
£
p21 (t) y11 + p1p2 · (y21 + y12)
¤
δt +
[s]X
t=0
p2 (t) y22δ
t +
+∞X
t=[s]+1
p22 (t)Y22δ
t.
For ρ → 1, V (ρ) → y11 + Y22r > Y11 1+rr for small enough r. For ρ→ 0, the new coalition
6Note that as in all kinds of collective punishment equilibria this is purely a matter of coordination.
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formation date s → +∞ (see expression 14), and consequently, limρ→0V (ρ) is bounded
from above by y22(1+r)
r
< Y11(1+r)
r
.
Therefore, there exist both ranges of parameter values where adjustment alternatively
is or is not socially optimal. However, even when it is socially optimal, it involves transi-
tory surplus decline.
5 Conclusion
We have studied evolution of informal contract enforcement, highlighting the role of two
factors, common knowledge of the types (induced preferences) of other players, and li-
ability limitations stemming from the transient nature of a firm. Our models yield a
surprisingly rich set of predictions which we explore in the context of an economy in
transition. If the economy is eventually to fully restructure and resume growth, as our
first model argues, it will have to be able to take advantage of specialized techniques of
production; this is only possible if trust is established among stranger firms. We have ar-
gued that this trust is not hard-wired in the evolutionary game-theoretic sense, but rather
stems from the common knowledge of the preferences of other firms. If general investment
(or restructuring) raises the opportunity costs of breach of contract, the economy must
find a way to credibly signal that the investment has in fact occurred. On the equilibrium
adjustment path this need manifests itself in the spell of relatively primitive contracts,
with specialization below the long-run level. By deliberately operating at less than full
throttle, the firms are signalling that they are adjusting, thus investing in trust. We
have demonstrated that this feature is central to the success of transition, and is robust
to relaxation of the convex adjustment costs assumption. Moreover, in an informational
40
sense this self-organization process is eﬃcient, which gives credit to the invisible hand and
some hope for the ultimate success of some of the most backward transition economies,
despite the inertia and blunders in upgrading of the legal edifice.
Our second model made the point that certain fundamental, non-legal liability lim-
itations, such as the impossibility to punish individual factors of production left when
firms disintegrate, impose extra strain on the informal contract enforcement institutions
in times of rapid change. Conditions, suﬃcient for their smooth operation in a station-
ary economy are no longer so in these times. Consequently, existing coalitions may be
gone before the new have had time to develop, implying a period of turmoil and seeming
regress. This turmoil is inevitable, but it will give place to newly restored order when the
constituency for the new coalition reaches a critical level. The economy will be back on
track, with no intervention of social planner or external assistance.
Our explicitly dynamic approach has allowed us to overcome conceptual diﬃculties
that endanger any contribution to economics of institutions, such as the indeterminateness
of the institutional content and emphasis on persistence. The fact that an economy can
regain orderliness with no radical intervention, on its own, makes a case for fine-tuning
and the corresponding shift of research focus away from multiple steady states alarmism.
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A Technical appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. The payoﬀ functions of the firms V (0) are supermodular with respect to their
own strategy variables {a (t)}+∞t=0 :
∂2V
∂a (t) ∂a (t+ 1)
=
µ
1
1 + r
¶t+1
C 00 (·) > 0,
∂2V
∂a (t) ∂a (t+ k)
= 0, k > 1
Further, firms’ payoﬀ have decreasing diﬀerences in their strategy variables a and strate-
gies of their opponents a∗:
∂2V
∂a (t) ∂a∗ (t)
=
µ
1
1 + r
¶t
∂2F (a∗ (t) , a (t) , s (t))
∂a (t) ∂a∗ (t)
> 0,
∂2V
∂a (t) ∂a∗ (t+ k)
= 0, k 6= 0
This is suﬃcient for equilibrium existence as demonstrated by Milgrom and Roberts
[1990].
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A.2 Proof of proposition 3
Proof. This follows because individual payoﬀs (3) have increasing diﬀerences in (a, s)
and (a∗, s) [Milgrom and Roberts, 1990]:
∂2V
∂a (t) ∂s (t)
=
µ
1
1 + r
¶t
∂2F (a∗, a, s)
∂a∂s
> 0
∂2V
∂a∗ (t) ∂s (t)
=
µ
1
1 + r
¶t
∂2F (a∗, a, s)
∂a∗∂s
> 0
∂2V
∂a (t) ∂s (t+ k)
=
∂2V
∂a∗ (t) ∂s (t+ k)
= 0, k 6= 0
A.3 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. Suppose V (t) > d (a∗ (t) , s (t)) + V0 for t ∈ T , µ (T ) > 0. Consider s˜ (t) > s (t)
for t ∈ T, s˜ (t) = s (t), t /∈ T, and such that ks˜− sk = supt |s˜ (t)− s (t)| is infinitesimal.
Consider a˜∗ (t) — the quasi-equilibrium profile of restructuring corresponding to s˜ (t) . By
continuity of solution to a system of diﬀerential equations, the distance ka˜∗ − a∗k will
also be infinitesimal.
1. For all t ∈ T,
V (t, {a˜∗ (·) , s˜ (·)}) > V (t, {a∗ (·) , s (·)}) .
Moreover, by continuity of the diﬀerence V (t)− d (a∗ (t) , s (t)) ,
V (t, {a˜∗ (·) , s˜ (·)})− d (a˜∗ (t) , s˜ (t)) > V0
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(for ks˜− sk and ka˜∗ − a∗k infinitesimal).
2. For all t /∈ T, t < sup {T} , V (t, {a∗ (·) , s˜ (·)}) > V (t, {a∗ (·) , s (·)}) = d (a∗ (t) , s˜ (t))+
V0 (because the future payoﬀ has increased). For infinitesimal ka˜∗ − a∗k , by conti-
nuity of the diﬀerence,
V (t, {a˜∗ (·) , s˜ (·)}) > d (a˜∗ (t) , s˜ (t)) + V0 > V (t, {a∗ (·) , s (·)}) .
3. For all t /∈ T, t > sup {T} , s˜ (t) ≡ s (t) . a˜∗ (t) may or may not be diﬀerent from
a∗ (t) . In any event,
V (t, {a˜∗ (·) , s˜ (·)}) ≥ V (t, {a∗ (·) , s (·)}) = d (a˜∗ (t) , s˜ (t)) + V0.
In all three subsets of the real line, the incentive compatibility constraint (5) is satis-
fied. Therefore, quasi-equilibrium {a˜∗ (·) , s˜ (·)} is full equilibrium. Since s˜ (t) > s (t) for
all t ∈ T , µ (T ) > 0, V (0, {a˜∗ (·) , s˜ (·)}) > V (0, {a∗ (·) , s (·)}) . Therefore, s˜ (t) yields a
better equilibrium. Therefore, s (t) was not socially optimal.
A.4 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Consider a pair of firms at arbitrary time t0 deliberating a instantaneous deviation
from a path s∗ (t) . Any s˜ (t0) above the socially optimal s∗ (t0) is inconsistent with the
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incentives to honor the contract since
V (t) =
+∞X
τ=t
µ
1
1 + r
¶τ−t ·
1
2
F (a∗ (τ) , a∗ (τ) , s (τ))− c (τ)
¸
= d (a∗ (t0) , s∗ (t0)) + V0
< d (a∗ (t0) , s˜ (t0)) + V0
(by monotonicity of d (a, s)). None of the firms agreeing on s˜ (t0) would honor the con-
tract. Hence, both firms will renege and share zero surplus at t0 which is less than
F (a∗ (t0) , a∗ (t0) , s∗ (t0)) .
Choosing any s˜ (t0) < s∗ (t0) is similarly suboptimal because F (·) is increasing in s and
the incentive constraint is satisfied in either case. This proves that s∗ (t) is coalition-proof.
Any path s (t) exceeding s∗ (t) at a point t > 0 is not an equilibrium by proposition
1. Any degenerate equilibrium (T = 0) is not coalition-proof because in all viable quasi-
equilibria (T = +∞) output is strictly greater. No viable quasi-equilibrium with s (t) <
s∗ (t) on a set of non-zero measure is coalition proof, because payoﬀ can be increased by
pairs of firms by agreeing on s∗ (t) .
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Figure 1. Evolution of restructuring and contract 
specialization on equilibrium path
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Figure 2. The role of incentive constraint
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Figure 3.
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Figure 4. U-shaped specialization path
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